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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOTE

CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT V. GARRET:
PROVIDING MEDICALLY RELATED SERVICES TO CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

INTRODUCTION
In 1975, eight million children suffered from disabilities in the United
States.1 The majority of these children were insufficiently educated and more
than one million were barred from the public school system entirely.2
Currently, there are nearly 2.5 million children with disabilities that receive an
inadequate education.3 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act4
(IDEA), originally entitled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
19755 (EAHCA), was created as Congress’s response to the lack of educational
opportunities for children with disabilities.6 In its most recent IDEA case,
Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret,7 the High Court continued
to expand upon this Congressional goal by affirming the lower court’s decision
to provide “related services” and a “free appropriate public education” to
children with disabilities.8
Prior to Garret, but within the past ten to fifteen years, burdens on school
districts to provide the educational opportunity the IDEA requires have grown
1. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189
(1982) (citing Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1970, 94 Pub. L. No. 142, 89 Stat.
774 (1975)); see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1) (1994).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(3)-(4) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189.
3. Matthew J. Schaefer, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: “Related Services”
Versus “Medical Services?”, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 143 (1999).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994).
5. 94 Pub. L. No. 142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
6. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
7. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
8. Id. at 1000.
231
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substantially.9 In response to state and local concerns, the pre-Garret courts
delivered numerous decisions absolving school districts from furnishing fulltime health “related services” to students with disabilities.10 Those courts held
that Congress did not intend the IDEA to impose unexpected financial and
administrative burdens upon states.11
The Garret Court addressed this issue and resolved that school districts are
required to provide “related services” to special education students, as long as
the services do not fall into the “medical services” exemption.12 The IDEA
limits “medical services” to those services provided for diagnostic and
evaluative purposes only.13 In Irving Independent School District v. Tatro,14
the forerunner to the Garret decision, the Court restricted “medical services”
even further by holding that health services provided by a physician are
excluded from “related services.”15 However, services provided by a nurse or
other non-physician health care professional are included as “related
services.”16 Affirming and clarifying Tatro, the Supreme Court in Garret
unreasonably held that a school district must supply a one-on-one nurse to
provide extensive and intense health services to children with life-threatening
conditions so children with disabilities can receive a public education.17
This Note will first examine the foundation, rationale and relevant
statutory regulations of the IDEA. This section will also study the case history
leading to the initiation of the IDEA. Section two will review the case history
prior to Garret and the problems raised by a “provider-based” rule. It will
distinguish “related services” from “medical services” and clarify why the
extent and nature of the services must be considered. This Note will evaluate
Congress’s intent and the purpose of the IDEA regarding the responsibilities of
school districts as reasonable, fair and not excessively burdensome. In the
third section, the Garret decision will be thoroughly assessed and critically
analyzed.
This Note concludes that the extent and nature of the services provided
must be balanced with a reasonably anticipated financial and educational
9. See infra notes 123, 154-55 and accompanying text.
10. See Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Detsel v. Bd.
of Educ. of Auburn Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987). See Granite Sch.
Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992). See Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71
(W.D. Pa. 1987). See also Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett, 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999)
(abrogating Neely and Detsel).
11. See infra notes 118, 123, 149, 153 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
14. 468 U.S. 883, 883 (1984) (holding that children with disabilities deserve a public
education and “related services,” but not “medical services”).
15. Id. at 892.
16. Id.
17. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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commitment of a school district to determine whether full-time nursing
services are feasible.18 A bright line “provider-based” rule is inadequate and
discounts the purpose of the IDEA to educate and attend to “medically fragile”
students when appropriate.19
HISTORY
I.
A.

THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

Origin of the IDEA and Congress’s Intent

Congress first addressed the issue of educating children with disabilities in
1966.20 It revised the “Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to
establish a grant program ‘for the purpose of assisting the states in the
initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects . . . for the
education of handicapped children.’”21 This program was repealed in 1970
and replaced by the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).22 While both
programs were implemented to encourage states to develop financial resources
for education, neither Act proposed specific guidelines for the utilization of
federal money.23
In 1974, Congress granted large sums of federal money to the states to
enroll and educate children with handicaps in the public school system.24 The
following year Congress passed the EAHCA to establish state education
programs supported by federal funds.25 Then, in 1991, Congress amended the
EAHCA by substituting and codifying the registered name to the IDEA.26
In order for a state to qualify for federal financial assistance under the
IDEA, it must demonstrate that students with handicaps are afforded a “free
appropriate public education.”27 States must also devise an educational policy
in a state plan to be approved by the Secretary of Education.28 This policy
must identify and detail the curriculum, services and objectives that will be
18. See infra notes 130 and 168 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 147, 154-55 and 158 and accompanying text.
20. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982)
(citing Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 89 Pub. L. No. 750, § 161, 80 Stat.
1204 (1966)).
21. Id.; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179-80 (quoting 89 Pub. L. No. 750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204).
22. Education of the Handicapped Act, 91 Pub. L. No. 230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970).
23. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
24. Id. (citing 93 Pub. L. 380, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974) (allowing Congress an interim of one
year “to study what if any additional Federal assistance [was] required to enable the states to meet
the needs of handicapped children”).
25. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
26. 102 Pub. L. No. 119, § 25(b).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180-81.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181.
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implemented and accomplished to improve special education.29 The policy
must also give priority “first with respect to children with disabilities who are
not receiving an education, and second with respect to children with
disabilities, within each disability category, with the most severe disabilities
who are receiving an inadequate education. . . .”30 Congress stated in the
statute that it is in the national interest to provide financial resources to the
states to ensure that local schools meet the educational needs of children with
disabilities.31
B.

Landmark Cases for the Initiation of the IDEA and the Provision of
“Related Services”: PARC and Mills

In the early 1970’s, two district court cases served as milestones to
Congress’s enactment of the IDEA.32 The first, Pennsylvania Ass’n. for
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,33 determined that
school-aged children with disabilities were entitled to free public education
and training.34 The court adopted a consent agreement, written by the parties,
obligating the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide access to education
and training for children with mental and physical disabilities suitable to each
child’s capacities.35 Under this consent agreement, school districts had to
provide notice of the educational opportunity and plan to name, locate and
evaluate all children with handicaps that were eligible for public education.36
Further, the court required the Secretary of Education to assure that an
Individualized Education Program (IEP) appropriate to each child’s capability
was in place.37 The court also required that the Secretary be informed of the
educational status of each child with mental handicaps.38 Because Congress’s
intent was to integrate these students into the public school system, the court

29. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413 (1994)).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1994).
32. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180 n.2 (identifying Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.C. 1972) and Pennsylvania Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC] as the most prominent cases in the
endorsement of the IDEA).
33. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
34. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302 (enjoining the defendants from applying the Public School
Code of 1949, 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1304, 1330(2), 13-1371(1) and 13-1375, to postpone,
deny, or terminate the education or training of mentally handicapped students).
35. Id. at 306-07 (explaining in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the consent agreement that the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania assumed this responsibility); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
36. PARC, 343 F.Supp. at 314 (pursuing handicapped children by television and radio
broadcasting, newspaper publishings, school records, and hospital or other related facilities
listings).
37. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 313-14.
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declared homebound instruction to be the least favorable alternative to primary
public education.39 Rather, the court opined that primary public education
benefits a child with handicaps through efficient and thorough classroom
instruction and social learning. The court relied on expert testimony to
conclude that people with mental handicaps are able to attain self-sufficiency
and aptitude through proper training and instruction.40
The second case, Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia,41
held that children with handicaps could not be entirely excluded from publicly
supported education.42 Mills required equity in funding for programs and a
balance in importance of services for students with and without disabilities
alike.43 The seven minor plaintiffs were alleged to have “behavioral
problems,” mental retardation and physical abnormalities.44 These disabilities
led to their expulsion or denial from public schools.45 The court enjoined the
school district from eliminating these students and ordered that the students
must be afforded due process and a hearing before a hearing officer prior to
suspension, expulsion, denial or transfer from public education.46
The court required the school to devise a plan detailing its efforts to
develop educational assessments, courses, goals and additional services for
these “exceptional” students.47 The court further determined that the Board of
Education was responsible for providing the opportunity and facility for this

39. Id. at 313-14 (stating that home instruction shall only occur when it is not feasible to
educate in the public or special schools and commands re-evaluation every three months to ensure
that it is most appropriate to the child’s capacity).
40. Id. at 296 (stating that achieving self-care and social independence is highly probable).
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 296 n.50 (citing DR. AUBREY J. YATES, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 234 (1970)).
41. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
42. Id. at 878 (stating that providing adequate educational alternatives, a prior hearing and
periodic re-evaluation of the handicapped student, is essential in the absence of public education);
see Kelly S. Thompson, Limits on the Ability to Discipline Disabled School Children: Do the
1997 Amendments to the IDEA Go Far Enough, 32 IND. L. REV. 565, 567 (1999).
43. Mills v. Board of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.C. 1972) (stating that failing
to retain these students due to lack of financial resources is inexcusable).
44. Id. at 869-70; see also Thompson, supra note 42, at 567.
45. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 869-70 (promising placement in the public school system, the
school district again denied admittance and divested tuition grants for private special education).
46. Id. at 880-81 (recognizing that disciplinary actions are permitted up to two days without
first notifying the student’s parent or guardian); see also Thompson, supra note 42, at 567 (stating
that violating this regulation infringes upon constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process).
47. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 879; Pennsylvania Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (defining “exceptional children” as
“children of school age who deviate from the average in physical, mental, emotional or social
characteristics to such an extent that they require special educational facilities or services . . . .”)
(citing 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1371(1)).
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teaching.48 Additionally, the Board of Education was compelled to coordinate
educational, vocational and recreational activities for individual and civic
purposes.49 In reaching these conclusions, the court relied on the Supreme
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education:50
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.51

C. IDEA Statutory Principles, Policies and Definitions
The IDEA targets children with disabilities who are between the ages of
three and twenty-one.52 “Children with disabilities” includes children
challenged with “orthopedic impairments . . . [and] other health
impairments . . .; who, by reason thereof, need special education and related
services.”53 Special education is characterized as “specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a
child with a disability . . . .”54
The phrase “related services” is defined as:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services (including . . . physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including
therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including
rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical
services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and
includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in
children.55

48. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876 The Board is ultimately responsible for “maximiz[ing]
coordination of educational and other municipal programs and services in achieving the most
effective educational system and utilization of educational facilities.” Id.
49. Id. at 876-77 (using these services and resources to promote the prominence of the
school in the community).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874-75 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
52. Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, What is IDEA?, at
http://www.granite.k12.ut.us/Special_Ed/p194142.html (last visited Oct. 3, 1999).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994).
54. Id. at § 1401(a)(16), (a)(16)(A)-(B) (1994) (including classroom, homebound, hospital,
institution, and physical education).
55. Id. at § 1401(a)(17) (1994); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) (1998).
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Within the “related services” provision is the “medical services” exemption.56
The term “medical services” means “services provided by a licensed physician
to determine a child’s medically related disability that results in the child’s
need for special education and related services.”57 Importantly, “medical
services” only include those services that are provided by a licensed physician,
not services provided by a nurse or other professional health care provider.58
In addition, the term “school health services” refers to “services provided
by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person.”59 A student with a
disability will qualify for a “free appropriate public education” if the provided
services are “school health services” or “related services,” but not when the
services are “medical services.”60
The expression “free appropriate public education” means “special
education and related services that A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, . . . and D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program . . . .”61 The term “free”
means that the education is provided without cost to the family.62 While the
term “appropriate” may include an out-of-district school or a private
institution, “appropriate” does not necessarily mean the “best” education.63
The student’s “appropriate” educational needs are set forth in the IEP.64
An IEP is a written legal document that is specifically formulated to
describe the curriculum and special services of each child with a disability.65
An IEP is developed by a parent or guardian and a teacher, while one in an
administrative position supervises the execution of the plan.66 Congress
requires that each IEP include:
A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child,
B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives,

56. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
57. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16; see also infra note 203 and accompanying text.
58. See also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
59. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11) (1998); see also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
60. See also infra notes 219, 222-23, 240 and 242 and accompanying text.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(A)-(D) (1994).
62. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (1994); see also Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, What is IDEA?, supra note 52 (pledging to reach the educational
needs, goals, and services the child requires).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20); see also Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, What is IDEA?, supra note 52 (identifying the student and other people involved
in the child’s education when appropriate).
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C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such
child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in
regular educational programs,
D) a statement of the needed transition services67 . . .,
E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services,
and
F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives
are being achieved.68

When a parent or guardian is dissatisfied with the IEP, he or she is entitled
to examine the records to inspect the child’s educational development69 and
can obtain an evaluation of the student’s academic performance.70 If the IEP is
unsatisfactory, then a complaint may be filed with a state, local, or
intermediate educational agency.71 Pending the decision of a local or
intermediate hearing, a party may appeal to the state agency.72
An action to modify the IEP can be made after the administrative remedies
provided by the IDEA have been exhausted.73 The purpose of exhausting the
administrative remedies is to allow the school district to utilize its educational
proficiency to develop a special education curriculum and to compose a factual
record.74 An aggrieved party, who is denied the right to an appeal or who is
still frustrated by the state agency decision, may bring a civil action in the
federal district court or a state court of competent jurisdiction.75
D. Purpose of the IDEA
The IDEA resolves to establish a “free appropriate public education”
program for students with disabilities on an individualized basis in the least

67. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1994) (stating that transition services incorporate postsecondary education, vocational training, and independent living preparation, based on the
individual student’s needs).
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(A)-(F) (1994).
69. Id. at § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1994).
70. Id.
71. Id. at § 1415(i)(E).
72. Id. at § 1415(c).
73. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. South Lyon Cmty. Sch., 602 N.W.2d 588, 592-93 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415).
74. Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696 (Ely), 951 F. Supp. 867, 888 (D. Minn. 1996)
(allowing the school district the opportunity to correct the educational program of the current
IEP).
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(2) (1994) (stating that filing a complaint in the federal court is
permitted, regardless of the amount in controversy).
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restrictive environment.76 It obligates a school district to sustain and evaluate
the effort and success of such education.77 The statute says that children with
handicaps will receive “a free appropriate public education that emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs . . . .”78 Although “related services” are required by the IDEA, the
statute does not expressly state that a school district must provide a one-on-one
nurse or full-time individualized nursing services to children with disabilities.79
Each participating state must devise a plan to provide children with
disabilities a full educational opportunity and “related services.”80 States must
draft a comprehensive schedule for achieving this plan and explain the type
and quantity of facilities, personnel and services that are needed throughout the
State to accomplish the goals set therein.81 Additionally, in order to effectuate
the “free appropriate public education,” the IDEA requires that students “in
need of special education and related services [be] identified, located, and
evaluated.”82
Another purpose of the IDEA is to educate children with disabilities along
with children without disabilities “to the maximum extent appropriate.”83 The
IDEA, however, does not obligate public schools to “mainstream” children
with disabilities or to maximize each child’s learning potential.84 Despite the
“mainstreaming” preference, “the nature or severity of the disability [may be]
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily . . . .”85 The ability to learn and
retain information differs for each student, and providing equal educational
opportunities to children with disabilities is an “entirely unworkable standard
requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.”86

76. Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, What is IDEA?,
supra note 52 (summarizing the basic tenants of the IDEA).
77. Id.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
79. Id. at § 1401(22).
80. Id. at § 1412(a)(1)-(2).
81. Id. at § 1412(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
82. Id. at § 1412(a)(3)(A).
83. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181
(1982), 198-99.
84. Id. at 189 (stating that “[n]oticeably absent from the language of the statute is any
substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children”).
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n.4.
86. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198 (noting that “furnishing handicapped children with only such
services as are available to nonhandicapped [sic] children would in all probability fall short of the
statutory requirement of ‘free appropriate public education’; to require, on the other hand, the
furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential is,
we think, further than Congress intended to go”).
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA
A.

Bright Line Physician/non-physician Test for “Related Services”

In Tatro, an eight-year old girl suffered from spina bifida,87 which
impaired her speech and voluntary secretion of urine.88 She required clean
intermittent catherization89 (CIC) from a school nurse, or other qualified
individual, as a “supportive service” to stay in school.90 The Tatro Court
applied the statutory definition of “related services” to determine whether CIC
is within the scope of the IDEA.91 Because CIC is not specifically listed in the
“related services” provision of the IDEA, the Court established a two-step test
to aid it in its decision.92
First, the Court declared that it must decide if CIC was a “‘supportive
servic[e] . . . required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education’; and second, whether CIC is excluded from this definition as a
‘medical servic[e].’”93 If the CIC services did not meet the “related services”
definition, or did meet the “related services” definition, but qualified as a
“medical services” exemption, then the school district was relieved of the
responsibility to provide a “free appropriate public education.”94 In order to
minimize the burden of the school district from providing an array of health
services, the Court noted several statutory limitations.95 A school district was
only obligated to provide “related services” if: 1) the child had disabilities and
required special education, 2) the services were essential to the student’s
success in special education, and 3) the services were not performed by a
licensed physician.96

87. Spina Bifida, at http://members.tripod.com/~imaware/sb.html (last visited Oct. 25,
1999). Spina Bifida is a physical disability caused by a prenatal malformation of the spine in
which the spinal column does not fasten together. Id.
88. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885.
89. Id.; Cincinatti Children’s Hospital Medical Center, Intermittent Catherization – Males
(Clean Technique), at http://www.chmcc.org/family/pep/pep2031.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2000).
CIC is a mechanism used to excrete urine from the bladder via a catheter. Id. CIC is a simple
service requiring little training and can be performed in just a few minutes. Tatro, 468 U.S. at
885.
90. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890-91, aff’g Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983).
91. Id. at 890.
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (Supp. IV 1998); Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890.
93. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890.
94. See id. at 895.
95. Id. at 894.
96. Id. at 894. “In the absence of a handicap that requires special education, the need for
what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create an obligation under the Act.” Id.
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The Supreme Court found CIC to be a “related service” and that it fit the
definition of a “school health service.”97 As a supportive service, CIC
benefited the plaintiff and allowed her to attend public school and receive an
appropriate education.98 Because a licensed physician did not deliver CIC and
the services were not beyond diagnostic or evaluative purposes, the Court did
not regard CIC as falling under the “medical services” exclusion.99 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied on the statutory interpretation by the Secretary
of Education that “medical services” provided by a physician or hospital are
excludable, but not when the services are provided by a school nurse.100 Thus,
the Court did not consider CIC to be extrinsically burdensome. The Court
stated that the Secretary’s determination was reasonable even though the Court
recognized that Congress spent practically no time or effort explaining the
“medical services” exemption.101
Providing CIC at school tendered the plaintiff with “meaningful access” to
public education and was no more demanding “than are services that enable
the child to reach, enter, or exit the school.”102 Congress’ desire when enacting
the IDEA was to provide students with disabilities access to public
education.103 The IDEA does not require that school districts guarantee a
particular level of learning or that the provision of “related services” will
maximize a student’s learning potential.104
Although the defendant in Tatro contested that CIC fell under the “medical
services” exclusion regardless of the provider, the Tatro Court said that this
exclusion was only intended to excuse school districts from excessively
expensive and onerous services, such as those provided by a physician.105 The
Court evaluated services that are administered by a nurse to students without
disabilities, but prescribed by a physician, as indicative and inclusive of the
services to be provided to students with disabilities as well.106 Thus, the Court
said that CIC was not unlike or easily distinguishable from those services that
are routinely provided to students without disabilities.107
97. Id. at 892 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1983), revised by 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11)
(1998)).
98. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890.
99. Id. at 892, 895.
100. Id. at 892-93.
101. Id. at 892.
102. Id. at 891.
103. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Schl. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191
(1982).
104. Id. at 200.
105. Tatro, 469 U.S. at 892 (specifying that children with extreme medical conditions are
entitled to special education through homebound or hospital instruction).
106. Id. at 893-94 (extending special services to non-handicapped students, such as
emergency injections, is analogous to the provision of CIC for handicapped students).
107. Id. at 893-94.
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School nurses are an integral element of the educational system; it is
reasonable to infer that Congress did not intend the “medical services”
exclusion to apply to the services nurses provide.108 In contrast, the services
provided by a physician or hospital are significantly more expensive and may
be beyond the competence of a school nurse.109 As a result, the Tatro Court
created a bright-line “provider-based” rule; those services that are provided by
a physician, other than for diagnosis and evaluation, are excluded from “related
services” as a “medical services” exemption.110
B.

The Expansion of the Tatro Rule
1.

Full-Time Nursing Services are not “Related Services”: They Create
an Undue Burden and Financial Encumbrance on a School District

Courts have rejected Tatro’s “physician-based” rule as determinative of
whether health-care services qualify as related or medical services.111
Congressional intent was interpreted more broadly and a reasonableness
standard was initiated to replace the “physician-based” rule. These cases
stressed the importance of fairness and practicality when balancing the
inherent burdens on the school district with the uncertain benefits to the
student.112
Since Tatro, numerous cases involving more extensive and intense health
related services have come before the lower courts. In Bevin v. Wright,113 the
seven-year old plaintiff suffered from severe mental retardation, seizures,
blindness and extreme difficulty in breathing.114 Because of these disabilities,
it was necessary for a nurse to regularly suction Bevin’s tracheostomy tube,
provide a constant source of oxygen and stay with Bevin throughout the day to
prevent injury.115 In contrast to students who required intermittent treatment,
108. Id. at 893 (nursing services are not a significant burden on a school district).
109. Id. The court noted that medical services performed by a licensed physician “serve other
purposes.” Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892 n.10.
110. Id. at 891-95; Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret, 106 F.3d 822, 825
(8th Cir. 1997).
111. See, e.g., Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d
635, 643 (9th Cir. 1990).
112. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
113. 666 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
114. Id. at 72. Bronchopulmonary dysplasia is a chronic lung disease incident to infants with
lung infection or resulting from mechanical respiration because of premature birth.
Brochopulmonary Dysplasia, at http://www2.medsch.wisc.edu/childrenhosp/parents_of_
preemies/bpd.html (last visited Oct. 25, 1999). Common symptoms include wheezing, rapid
breathing and slowed growth. Id.
115. Bevin, 666 F.Supp. at 73. In order to prevent serious injury to Bevin in case a mucous
plug blocks her tracheostomy tube, she must get immediate nursing attention within thirty
seconds. Id.
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like the plaintiff in Tatro, Bevin needed constant care and attention as the
“private duty” of a health care provider.116 The plaintiff contended that the
type of health-care provider was conclusive and that the extent and nature of
the services provided was irrelevant.117
The court found that the chronic health services Bevin required were
expensive, comprehensive and time-consuming.118 Bevin’s services did not
comport with the exact terms of the “medical services” definition, nor did they
qualify as simple school health services.119 Even though a physician did not
provide these services, their exclusion corresponded with the general spirit of
the IDEA.120
The court recognized that states receive the benefit of federal money and
may be required to provide special services or acquire additional personnel.121
The plaintiffs argued that “[t]he determination of what is a medical service and
therefore not the obligation of the school district is based solely on the status of
the health care provider. The nature and extent of the services are
irrelevant.”122 However, the court held that school districts were not required
to provide extensive nursing services that are so intensive and costly that they
more closely resemble the excluded “medical services” than the included
“related services.”123
The Bevin court relied on the Third Circuit case, Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School District,124 for the proposition that time and money are significant
criterion to be considered in the determination of whether services are
includable “related services” or excludable “medical services.”125 The Bevin
court noted that Tokarcik did not restrict its analysis to the professional status
of the health care provider.126 The Bevin court followed this line of reasoning
to determine that the nursing services Bevin required were outside the spirit of
the IDEA.127 The court concluded that full-time nursing services are beyond

116. Id. at 75. “Because of this need for constant vigilance, a school nurse or any other
qualified person with responsibility for other children within the school could not safely care for
Bevin.” Id.
117. Id. at 74.
118. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 74-5. Life-threatening prospect is far beyond the burden the court
will delegate to the school district, however, it is not the intent of the court that only inexpensive,
simple services be provided. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 76.
122. Id. at 74.
123. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 76.
124. 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1981).
125. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 75 (citing Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 663 F.2d 443, 456
(3rd Cir. 1981)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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the “related services” provision and are more in the nature of “medical
services.”128
The Bevin court referred to Tokarcik to emphasize that “related services”
include what is required within reason to make an educational setting suitable
for a child with disabilities to benefit from it.129 A standard of reasonableness
and fair balance in assessing the adequacy of the services and the educational
environment is the more proper criteria.130 Thus, Bevin’s required services
were representative of the intended “medical services” exclusion enumerated
in the IDEA, as opposed to the incorporated “related services” which the IDEA
imposes upon school districts.131
In a similar case, the court in Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon132 denied
Shannon’s motion to affirm the judgment of the State Review Panel and
granted Granite’s motion for summary judgment.133 Shannon, a kindergarten
student, suffered from congenital neuromuscular disorder134 and severe
scoliosis,135 and was thus confined to a motorized wheelchair.136
Shannon also endured tracheostomy suctioning, feeding through a
nasogastric tube137 and manually assisted respiration when her inhalation of
oxygen was restricted.138 Shannon requested full-time nursing care as a
“related service” under the IDEA as part of her “free appropriate public

128. Id. at 75-6.
129. Id. at 75. “The Court proceeded not by ascertaining the status of the health care provider
as plaintiffs urge here, but on a careful review of the nature and extent of the services required by
the child and their impact on the school district.” Id. (referring to Department of Educ. v.
Katherine, 727 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1983)).
130. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 75 (examining the cost, treatment, time involved, existing school
health care providers, and the reasonableness of the requested services is more acceptable than
limiting the inquiry to the professional capacity of the provider).
131. Id. at 76.
132. 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992).
133. Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1021, 1030.
134. Compton’s Encyclopedia Online, Neuromuscular Disease (Visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/26754_Q.html>. Neuromuscular disorders can
transpire from damage to the spinal cord and can weaken muscles to the point of inability or
atrophy. Id.
135. KidsHealth.org, Straighten Up! Scoliosis Can Be Treated, at http://kidshealth.org/kid/
normal/scolio.html (last visited Oct. 25, 1999); What is Scoliosis, at http://www.medhelp.org/lib.
scolio.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999). Scoliosis is an abnormal “S-shaped” curve in the spine
which may cause body disfigurement, asymmetry, back pain, or correlate to heart failure. Id.
136. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1022.
137. While You Are Waiting, ICU Equipment: Nasogastric Tube, at http://www.waiting.com/
nasogastric.html (last visited Oct. 25, 1999). A nasogastric tube is a clear plastic tube inserted
through the nose, down the esophagus, and into the stomach and is used for feeding or cleansing.
Id.
138. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1022. Occasioning a heart attack, Shannon is not to be given
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Id.
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education.”139 The court distinguished Shannon’s care from the care delivered
in Tatro by focusing on the continuous duty of a school nurse to provide
immediate and life-preserving treatment.140
Additionally, the court found that the extensive nursing services Shannon
required fell within the “medical services” exclusion of the IDEA.141 The
court expressly stated that the Tatro “physician-based” rule was a “narrow
construction of the medical services exclusion of the Act.”142 The court
stressed the significance of the differences in the levels of care required in
Tatro to the more extensive services required in the present case.143 The court
concluded that Granite was not required to provide Shannon with full-time
nursing care as a supportive or related service under the IDEA.144
Further, the court found that Shannon received an educational benefit from
her homebound instruction.145 Though recognizing that Shannon would
receive more benefits from attending a public school with constant vigilance,
the Granite court concluded that the IDEA does not require schools to provide
every educational opportunity to completely dependent students suffering from
multiple or severe disabilities.146 Rather, the IDEA allows students to be
removed from the classroom when supplementary aids and services are
inadequate to facilitate satisfactory learning.147 The court was of the opinion
that “mainstreaming” or educating Shannon with other students without
disabilities could not be achieved satisfactorily.148 Shannon’s IEP bestowed
sufficient services to present her with educational opportunity and benefits at
home without burdening the school functionally or financially.149
In Detsel v. Bd. of Educ. of the Auburn Enlarged City Sch. Dist.,150 the
plaintiff, a seven-year old elementary school girl, required respirator support, a
139. Id. at 1022-23.
140. Id. at 1029-30. “The harsh reality of Shannon’s case is that she requires the full-time
care of at least a licensed practical nurse because of the constant possibility of a mucous plug in
her tracheostomy tube . . . . Without the appropriate care, Shannon’s disability becomes life
threatening.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1030.
143. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1030.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1028-29.
146. Id. at 1023, 1025, 1029 (relying on Thomas v. Cincinatti Bd. Of Educ., 918 F.2d 618
(6th Cir. 1990)) (reasoning that the court was not deciding if placement in public education would
be more advantageous, but that the revised IEP provided an education benefit and that the school
district satisfied the IDEA substantive provisions).
147. Id. at 1023 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1998)). See also supra note 87
and accompanying text.
148. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1030.
149. Id. at 1029 (costing Granite about $30,000 a year to provide Shannon constant nursing
care and detracting from other school programs).
150. 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987), aff’g 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. N.Y. 1986).
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continuous supply of oxygen and constant therapeutic attention.151 The
plaintiff emphasized the status and degree of the person performing the duty
and attempted to minimize the extent to which the services were provided.152
The district court recited the statement of the Secretary of Education in Tatro,
emphasizing that section 1401(a)(17) of the IDEA was “intended to spare
schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly
expensive and beyond the range of [a nurse’s] competence.”153 Furthermore,
the court invoked the principle from Tatro that not all health services are
required, regardless of their magnitude, if performed by another health-care
professional as opposed to a physician.154
The extreme nursing services in the instant case imposed a significant
burden on the defendant and the IDEA does not mandate a school district to
provide constant, expensive and intense in-school health care.155 Like Bevin,
the services in Detsel did not conform to the terms of the “medical services”
exclusion, nor were they simple examinations.156 Although the services Detsel
required did not meet the physician requisite, the burdensome full-time nursing
services were deemed to be outside the “related services” provision of the
IDEA and more akin to the “medical services” exclusion.157 As seen from this
interpretation, Tatro’s narrow evaluation of a provider-based analysis, “as the
sole criterion for determining when services fall under the medical exclusion
from liability,” is inadequate.158
In another case, Neely v. Rutherford County Sch.,159 the court reversed the
district court decision and held that certain requested services fell within the
“medical services” exception of the “related services” component of the
IDEA.160 Neely, a seven-year-old child who suffered from breathing
complications,161 demanded extensive attention and instant availability in case

151. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1023.
152. Id. at 1026.
153. Id.; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
154. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1027.
155. Id. at 1027 (noting that “[s]imple school nursing services do not similarly burden the
schools . . . [and] the Tatro decision does not require the provision of all health services,
regardless of their magnitude, if provided by one other than a physician”).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1026.
159. 68 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1995).
160. Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1995).
161. Congenital Central Hypoventilation Syndrome, Congenital Central Hypoventilation
Syndrome: Central Hypoventilation Syndrome: Ondine’s, at http://www.cafamily.org.uk/
Direct/c60.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2000). Central Hypoventilation Syndrome is a condition
where a child cannot adequately breathe for him or herself and requires support from a ventilator
attached to a tracheostomy. Id.
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of an emergency situation.162 Additionally, she required a tracheostomy tube
inserted into her stoma163 to aid her breathing, as well as regular suctioning of
her mouth, nose and throat to clear mucous blockage.164 The tracheostomy
tube could easily be dislodged and Neely could lose consciousness or even die
if respiration was not restarted promptly.165 Because Neely could not dispense
her own tracheostomy care, she required a competent and well-trained health
provider to administer the appropriate services.166
The court determined that such services were “medical in nature,” and
interpreted the Tatro decision to alleviate the obligation of providing every
such service.167 Hiring a school nurse to provide extensive medical services
specifically for Neely distinguished the instant case from Tatro.168 Rejecting
the traditional “provider-based” interpretation from Tatro, the Neely court
expanded the analysis of the care involved to include the extent and nature of
the services provided, regardless of the title or income of the actual provider.169
The court also notably considered the inherent risk and liability of the school
district in providing such controversial services.170 Granting deference to the
Bevin decision, the court in Neely agreed that it was the “private duty”
component of Neely’s necessary health care that made the services intrinsically
burdensome, and therefore within the “medical services” exemption of “related
services.”171
2.

In Accordance with Tatro: “Related Services” Include Full-Time
Nursing Services

In Morton Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M.,172 the court affirmed
a district court holding that J.M. was entitled to a full-time nurse as a “related

162. Neely, 68 F.3d at 967.
163. MedicineNet.com, Smart Medicine, at http://www.medicinenet.com/Script/Main/Art.asp
?li=MNI&d=28&ArticleKey=5559 (last visited Aug. 2, 2000). A stoma is “[a]n opening into the
body from the outside created by a surgeon.” Id.
164. Neely, 68 F.3d at 967. Suctioning is done using a mechanical device and secretion
obstruction varies with the seasons and her health. Id.
165. Id. Coughing or simple clothing adjustments can dislodge the tracheostomy tube.
166. Id. Training must be sufficient to prevent panic in emergency situations and provide
care with little margin of error.
167. Id. at 971 (resolving that Tatro does not require school districts “to provide every service
which is medical in nature”).
168. Neely, 68 F.3d at 971.
169. Id. at 970-71 (allowing such practice so long as the person possesses the requisite
licensing and training); see also Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(noting that the “restrictions imposed by Congress in section 1401(17) were intended to limit the
nature of the services required rather than the personnel who may provide the service”).
170. Neely, 68 F.3d at 971.
171. Id. at 972-73; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
172. 152 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1140 (1999).
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service” of his special education program.173 J.M. was regarded as “medically
fragile” and required invariable attention by an attendant to aid and observe his
respiration, lung and throat congestion and mobility.174 The court grappled
with distinguishing the definition of “medical services” as difficult to
distinguish between “related services of a medical nature that are covered by
the IDEA and medical services that are not covered.”175
The court concluded that “[c]atherization is obviously a medical service, so
after Tatro we know that the term ‘medical services’ in the statute and
regulation is not to be read literally.”176 Further, the court acknowledged that
restricting the “medical services” definition to only those services provided by
a physician would be illogical and unreasonable.177 Finally, the court reasoned
that while the IDEA does not expressly elicit an undue burden defense, one
may imply such a defense from “the statutory concepts of an ‘appropriate’
education and ‘related’ services.”178 After this discussion, however, the
appellate court retreated to the judicial findings and judgment of the district
court, and merely recognized the indistinct line separating supplementary
educational services from medical interventions.179
CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCH. DIST. V. GARRET
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1987, at the age of four, Garret’s spinal column was severed in a tragic
motorcycle accident leaving him paralyzed and ventilator dependant.180 As a
result of the accident, Garret required numerous procedures to tolerate his
debilitating condition, including:
urinary bladder catheterization about once a day, suctioning of his
tracheostomy181 as needed, food and drink on a regular schedule,

173. Morton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1998); Allan
G. Osborne, Jr., Comment, Supreme Court Rules That Schools Must Provide Full-Time Nursing
Services for Medically Fragile Students, 136 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1999).
174. J.M., 152 F.3d at 587.
175. Id. at 587.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. J.M., 152 F.3d at 586.
179. Id. at 587-88.
180. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 119 S.Ct. 992, 995 (1999).
181. AARON’S TRACHEOSTOMY PAGE, What is Tracheostomy, at http://www.twinenter
prises.com/trach/what.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999). Tracheostomy is an opening into the
windpipe in the throat, called a stoma. Id. Breathing is accomplished through a tube inserted into
the stoma. Id.; Aaron’s Tracheostomy Page, Suctioning a Tracheostomy, at
http://www.twinendterprises.com/trach/suction.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999). Suctioning of the
tracheostomy is done to remove mucus to make breathing easier. Id.
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repositioning, ambu bag182 administration183 if the ventilator malfunctions,
ventilator setting checks, observation for respiratory distress184 or autonomic
hyperreflexia, 185 blood pressure monitoring and bowel [disimpaction]186 in
cases of autonomic hyperreflexia.187

For individuals suffering from severe spinal cord injuries like Garret,
excessive activity of the autonomic nervous system,188 such as an overfull
bladder, could suddenly lead to autonomic hyperreflexia.189 In these
emergency situations, the lack of nerve impulses to the brain could cause the
blood pressure to rise uncontrollably and result in spasm, stroke and possibly
even death.190
In addition, Garret is entirely dependent on his ventilator, which
electrically sustains his breathing.191 In the event of a malfunction or
maintenance situation, manual pumping of an air bag attached to the ventilator
is essential.192 This process is known as ambu-bagging.193 Fortunately, Garret

182. Medspeak-The ER Dictionary, at http://www.knfpub.com/axe/er/medical.html#b (last
visited July 23, 2000). An ambu bag is a “handheld squeeze bag attached to a face mask.” Id.
183. Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1995). Controlled by
manual operation, “an ambu bag is a device that artificially pumps air into the lungs.” Id.
184. Aaron’s Tracheostomy Page, Tracheostomy Complications: Symptoms of Respiratory
Distress, at http:www.twinenterprises.com/trach/complica.htm (visited Oct. 25, 1999).
Respiratory distress indicates difficulty in breathing and can also signify an increased heart rate or
respiration rate. Id.
185. RehabTeamSite, Other Complications of Spinal Cord Injury: Automatic Dysreflexia
(Hyperreflexia), at http://calder.med.miami.edu/pointis/automatic.html (last visited Sept. 27,
1999). Autonomic dysreflexia (hyperreflexia) occurs when an irritating stimuli is introduced to
the body below the level of the spinal cord injury. Id. Nerve impulses are blocked at the site of
the spinal cord injury and this causes increased activity of the sympathetic portion of the
autonomic nervous system. Id. The blood pressure begins to rise and the brain receives impulses
from nerve receptors in the heart. Id. The heartbeat slows down, but the blood pressure cannot
be controlled due to the lesion in the spinal cord. Id. Spinal cord injuries that are most
susceptible to autonomic hyperrflexia are those which occur at a Thoracic 5 level or above. Id.
186. Medspeak, at http://www.knfpub.com/axe/er/medical.html#b (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
Bowel disimpaction is the “manual removal of impacted fecal matter from a patient’s rectum.”
Id.
187. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 106 F.3d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1997); see
also Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 995 n.3.
188. Femmer—The Autonomic Nervous System: The Autonomic Nervous System, at
http://deu.cctt.org/content/Femmer/Brian/AutonomicNervousSystem/AutonomicNervousSystem.
htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999). The Autonomic Nervous System regulates involuntary muscles
and involuntary body processes through the complementary sympathetic and parasympathetic
nervous systems. Id.
189. RehabTeamSite, Other Complications of Spinal Cord Injury: Automatic Dysreflexia
(Hyperreflexia), supra note 185.
190. Id.
191. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 995 n.2 (citing the A.L.J., App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a).
192. Id.
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has not recurrently experienced autonomic hyperreflexia or a lack of oxygen in
the past few years.194
Garret operates a motorized wheelchair through “a puff and suck straw,”
communicates orally and is mentally unaffected by his condition.195 Although
he is successful academically, he requires a personal attendant to care for his
continuous health care needs throughout the school day.196 In the fall of 1988,
Garret began kindergarten and his aunt served as his attendant.197 For the next
four years, Garret’s family employed a licensed practical nurse to provide oneon-one care and continuous supervision while Garret was in school.198 When
Garret reached the fifth grade, his mother requested that the Cedar Rapids
Community School District (District) accept financial responsibility for
Garret’s vital health care services.199 The District refused, denying that it had
the responsibility to provide such intense and extensive services.200
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY THAT LED GARRET TO THE SUPREME COURT
Subsequent to a hearing before the Iowa Department of Education, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that under the IDEA, the District was
financially responsible for all of the services Garret required.201 The ALJ
relied upon 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4) and (b)(11) to distinguish “‘school
health services,’ which are provided by a ‘qualified school nurse or other
qualified person,’ and ‘medical services,’ which are provided by a licensed
physician.”202 This distinction, according to the ALJ, was not determined by “
‘the title of the person providing the service,’ but instead, the ‘medical
services’ exclusion was limited to services that are ‘in the special training,
knowledge, and judgment of a physician to carry out.’”203
The District appealed this decision to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa.204 That court supported the ALJ’s decision and
granted summary judgment in favor of Garret.205 Dissatisfied with this

193. Medspeak, supra note 186. “Bagging” is defined as the “manual respiration for a patient
having breathing trouble that uses a handheld squeeze bag attached to a face mask.” Id.
194. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 995 n.3, (citing the A.L.J., App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a) (discussing
the services Garret requires throughout the day).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 995-96.
199. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 996.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4), (b)(11)); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
203. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 996 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 51(a)).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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decision, the District appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.206
Following the Supreme Court holding in Tatro, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Garret.207
The Court of Appeals utilized Tatro’s two-step test to first determine if the
services Garret required were defined as “supportive services,” and second,
whether such services went beyond the “medical services” exception of
diagnosis and evaluation by a physician.208 Hence, the court followed Tatro’s
bright line “physician-based” rule: “the services of a physician (other than for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the ‘medical services’
exclusion, but services that can be provided in the school setting by a nurse or
qualified layperson are not.”209
In its analysis, the court reasoned that without the aforementioned health
services, Garret would not be able to attend school or benefit from special
education.210 In sum, the court held that Garret’s services qualified as “school
health services” or “related services” because a physician did not provide
them.211 The court stated that without these services Garret would be denied
the very purpose for which the IDEA was enacted: to provide students with
disabilities the opportunity for an appropriate level of special education in the
public school system.212
Unlike the ALJ, the court focused on the title of the provider, rather than
the training, credence and comprehension involved in providing the services.213
The court made it clear that it would not interpret the dicta of Tatro beyond the
physician/non-physician test as several other circuits had already done.214
Although the court gave some indication that it may not have agreed with
Tatro, it acknowledged that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme
Court.215
III. THE DECISION OF THE GARRET MAJORITY
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Garret to resolve the divergence
in the lower courts concerning the appropriate test to determine if health care
services qualify as “related services” or “medical services.”216 In essence, the
Court stressed that the proper analysis is not the nature and extent of the
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 106 F.3d 822, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id.
Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 119 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1999).
Garret, 106 F.3d at 825.
Id.
Id.
Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 997.
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services at hand.217 The seven-to-two decision reaffirmed Tatro and explicitly
declared that the essential distinction is between the provider of “related
services” and “medical services,” not the degree to which these services are
provided.218 The Court held that medical services, however, cannot be
provided by a physician beyond diagnostic and evaluative purposes.219 In sum,
the Court affirmed summary judgment for Garret and ascertained that health
related services must be made available by a school district, even if it demands
extensive and continuous care.220
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, emphasized that the
intent of Congress and the purpose of the IDEA is to provide students with
disabilities the opportunity for meaningful access to a “free appropriate public
education.”221 In relying on its holding in Tatro, the Court reiterated “that the
Secretary of Education had reasonably determined that the term ‘medical
services’ referred only to services that must be performed by a physician [or
hospital], and not to school health services.”222 While the Court stressed that a
school nurse or other qualified individual provides “related services,” the
IDEA was held to make no such distinction.223
In Tatro, CIC was provided sporadically at school and was deemed a
“related service” within the scope of the IDEA.224 In the instant case, the
Court mistakenly determined that the periodic CIC in Tatro was no more
“medical” than the non-stop, life-preserving services required by Garret.225
Therefore, the majority incorrectly decided that Garret’s needs were “related
services” that the District must provide.226 According to the Court, however,
the term “medical services” does not encompass every form of health care that
may be described as “medical in other contexts.”227

217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 997-98, 998 n.7 (relying on the Secretary’s authority under the IDEA to take into
account the nature and extent of the services, both of which were excluded from 20 U.S.C. §
1401(22) (1994)) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae); see also Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
219. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 997-98, 998 n.6 (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1998)
defining “medical services;” the determination of the Secretary that services provided by a nurse
qualify as “related services,” but if similar services are provided by a physician they are
excludable as “medical services”).
220. Id. at 1000.
221. Id. (quoting Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) and Board of
Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
222. Id. at 997-98.
223. Id. at 995 n.1; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1994).
224. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 997; Tatro, 468 F.3d at 891, 895.
225. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 998.
226. Id. at 1000.
227. Id. at 997-98.
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the District’s proposal of a multi-factor
test to determine: “[1] whether the care is continuous or intermittent, [2]
whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, [3] the cost
of the service, and [4] the potential consequences if the service is not properly
performed.”228 In refusing to apply this test, the Court merely rebutted that the
District’s analysis “was not supported by any recognized source of legal
authority.”229 Although the Court’s definition of “medical services” cannot be
found in the text of the IDEA, it criticized the District’s four-pronged test as
unsubstantiated.230 While the Court does not elaborate on what makes one
service more “medical” than another, other than the profession of the healthcare provider, the Court asserted that the District presented no explanation as
to the characteristics that make health-related services more or less
“medical.”231
The District further contended that the financial burden, exceeding
$30,000, should be a sufficient reason to qualify Garret’s services as an
exemption.232 The Court noted that Congress’ definition of “related services”
does not include cost as an enumerated factor when determining the services a
school district is required to provide under the IDEA.233 However, the Court
acknowledged that “the IDEA requires schools to hire specially trained
personnel to meet disabled student needs.”234 The District declared that the
existing staff was insufficient to attend to other responsibilities while
simultaneously making a commitment to Garret on a one-on-one basis.235
Thus, the District argued that hiring new, specially trained personnel inherently
increased its financial burden.236 As resolved by the Court, however, even if
continuous services like Garret demanded created an increase in cost and
required additional personnel, such particulars have no apparent relationship to
“related services.”237
Although the Court recognized the District’s concerns as legitimate, it
concentrated on analyzing the interpretation of existing statutory and common
law.238 In reference to the ALJ, the Court agreed that the necessary care to
support Garret’s ventilator dependency does not require the training and

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 998 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 11).
Id. at 998.
Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 998.
Id.
Id. at 999; Osborne, supra note 173, at 1.
Garret, 119 S.Ct. at 999.
Id. at 998 n.8 (referring to Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 998.
Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 999.
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knowledge of a physician.239 Reiterating its decision in Tatro, the Court
concluded that “a rule that limits the medical services exemption to physician
services is unquestionably . . . reasonable and generally workable.”240
The majority opinion focused on “school health services” as an essential
component of a school district’s capacity to enhance the education of students
with special needs.241 It discounted the level or quantity of services provided,
even when continuous or cumbersome, so long as the services were not
provided by a qualified physician.242 The Court emphasized that the intent of
Congress is to provide students with handicaps the opportunity to a “free
appropriate public education” and “related services.”243 This conclusion,
however, unreasonably extends congressional intent and concludes that the
availability of “related services” is indispensable to ensure that students like
Garret are integrated into the public school system.244
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, and formulated
several important arguments against the majority view. First, the dissent
asserted that the majority incorrectly relied on the Tatro ruling that public
schools are required to provide “school nursing services” as a component of
“related services,” but not “medical services” provided by a physician.245
Second, the dissent stated that the majority’s conclusion is contrary to the text
of the IDEA and moreover, that it improperly relied on the Department of
Education’s regulations.246 The dissent criticized the majority opinion for
adhering to and extending Tatro, without regard to the constitutional rules of
construction that are applicable to the IDEA.247 Third, the dissent determined
that the majority violated the Spending Clause of the Constitution because
states are now burdened with broad and expensive health care services beyond
those anticipated.248
In support of its first argument, the dissent declared that the Court wrongly
focused on the provider of the services, instead of the nature of the services
themselves.249 The dissent stated that “[t]he term ‘medical’ similarly does not

239. Id. at 996.
240. Id. at 998.
241. Id. at 997, 1000.
242. Id. at 997-98.
243. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-01
(1982) (emphasis added).
244. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 999-1000.
245. Id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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support Tatro’s provider-specific approach, but encompasses services that are
‘of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or the practice of medicine.’”250
The dissent criticized the majority for failing to explain “why ‘services’ that
are ‘medical’ in nature are not ‘medical services.’”251 By analogy, the dissent
showed that automotive services are not limited to those performed by a
mechanic, but include repair services no matter who performs the work.252
Thus, the integral daily preventive health care services required by the IDEA
for special education students fundamentally relates to “medical services.”
Interpreting the IDEA in a practical manner, the dissent recognized that the
“Department of Education regulations require districts to provide disabled
children with health-related services that school nurses can perform as part of
their normal duties.”253 A school nurse typically renders health services to
many students throughout the day and is not responsible for one child only.
While school nurses may provide more services to some students than to
others, one-on-one supervision as a “private duty” is not within the normal
duties of a school nurse.254
In respect to its second argument, the dissent concluded that the intent of
Congress is pivotal to rendering a proper decision.255 Congressional intent is
revealed in the IDEA itself and the majority’s analysis should have been
complete simply by looking at the “related services” provision of the statute.256
Congress explicitly defined “related services” in the statute and intentionally
left out specific phrases and provisions.257 Moreover, a “provider-based”
determination is not expressed in the “related services” definition or the
“medical services” exclusion.258 In sum, the dissenters argued that the
majority failed to consider this inquiry and that it inappropriately deferred to
the Department of Education’s regulations.259
If Congress intended to distinguish “medical services” in such a manner as
to exclude those services provided by a physician, it would have done so.
Prior to Tatro, the proposed regulations by the Secretary of Education
250. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INT’L DICTIONARY 1402 (1986)).
251. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.J. 1996) (noting
that the school board is not required to furnish “services of a full-time attendant to monitor [the
plaintiff’s] tracheostomy tube and provide suctioning when needed. . . [;][t]hose are medical
services which the IDEA does not require a local school board to provide”).
255. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 1001.
257. Id. at 1000 n.1 (identifying “related services” as defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22)
(1994)).
258. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).
259. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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excluded medical services, defined as “services relating to the practice of
medicine.”260 Although the proposed regulations were never adopted,261 it is
important to recognize that the proposed definition did not envision a
“physician-based” rule. The dissent criticized the majority for erroneously
relying on its previous decision in Tatro, in which the Supreme Court held that
current regulations meant to exclude those services provided by a licensed
physician.262 According to the dissent, the Garret majority did not rely on the
regulation itself and any deference to a statute that does not exist is
impermissible.263
The dissent referred to other legislation that defines “[t]he term ‘medical
services’ [to] include[], in addition to medical examination, treatment[,] and
rehabilitative services[,] . . . preventive health services.”264 The purpose of the
IDEA is “to increase the educational opportunities available to disabled
children, not to provide medical care for them.”265 To hold states accountable
for access to a wide range of health services in schools, the dissenters argued,
is to expand the IDEA and the intent of Congress beyond rational and
reasonable expectation.266
In its final argument, the dissent contended that the term “related services”
should be construed narrowly and unambiguously so as not to burden school
districts with unexpected fiscal obligations.267 While drafting the IDEA,
Congress limited the state’s financial burdens by only requiring the
opportunity for an appropriate level of education, not a maximum level of
education.268 In addition, the Department of Education’s regulations provide
that children with disabilities should be afforded those services that are part of
the school nurse’s normal responsibilities.269 School districts are not obligated
260. Id. (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 3383[6] (1982)).
261. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 1001-02.
263. Id. at 1002.
264. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1001 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 38 U.S.C § 1701(6)); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (1994). “The term ‘medical care’ means amounts paid—for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure of function of the body.” Id.
265. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 1002-03.
267. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. And Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)); see also Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17 (1981); see also Board of
Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n.11 (1982); see
generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). “[I]f Congress desires to condition
the States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’” See also
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (spending power of Congress is subject to
distribution restrictions).
268. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 1003.
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to hire additional personnel to provide expensive and onerous care for students
with disabilities.270 This argument is consistent with the Court’s obligation to
interpret Spending Clause legislation narrowly.271
Because the IDEA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, it is
limited in its application and by its construction.272 The majority’s holding that
the extent and nature of the services is irrelevant to the relationship to “medical
services” contradicts the “rules of construction principles that are applicable to
Spending Clause legislation.”273 The dissent asserted that extending school
nursing services to a continuous one-on-one basis imposes extraordinary and
demanding obligations on school districts to absorb the financial encumbrances
for unexpected health related services.274 Such an imposition construes the
IDEA in too broad a fashion.275
In conclusion, the dissent demanded a limited interpretation of the IDEA to
prevent surprising economic burdens and excessive responsibilities beyond the
scope of reasonable anticipation.276 The IDEA was implemented to enhance
the educational opportunity for special needs children, not to institutionalize
medical services into the student’s curriculum or into the school district’s
operation.277 Hence, integrating students with handicaps into the public school
system is to be done in accordance with Spending Clause legislation and
Congressional intent when it is feasible and appropriate.278
ANALYSIS
The fundamental principle of the IDEA is to provide students with
disabilities the opportunity for “meaningful access” to special education in the
public school system when appropriate.279 The operative term in the
expression “free appropriate public education” is the word “appropriate.”
Limiting the determination of whether health services are appropriate to a
“provider-based” distinction disregards the intent of Congress and the
underlying purpose of the IDEA.280
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1002. “The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending
power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
‘contract.’ There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.” Id. (citing Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17).
273. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 203 and
accompanying text.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra notes 267 and 274 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
278. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
279. See supra notes 78 and 83 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 128-30, 136, 147, 154-55 and 203 and accompanying text.
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In Garret, the plaintiff was severely disabled and required vigilant nursing
services at all times, not merely a series of effortless and infrequent
examinations, like in Tatro.281 The Court inappropriately held that the services
Garret required were “related services,” even though they were medical in
nature.282 The Court encumbered the District with unexpected financial
obligations and the delivery of continuous medically related health services
based solely on the profession of Garret’s provider.283 Moreover, the Garret
majority failed to distinguish ancillary educational services from intense
medical interventions.284 Garret did not consider the risk or the plausible
consequences in case of an accident or the potential liability of the District.
Congress intended to identify and educate children with disabilities, but
did not expect school districts to supplement education with extreme medical
care or provide them every educational opportunity.285 Although unfavorable,
homebound instruction arguably may provide more educational benefits than
public schooling and may be more appropriate for students with extreme
debilitating conditions.286 Structuring an IEP for private education to include
social, educational and vocational elements will enable a child with disabilities
to learn and succeed in a more stable environment while simultaneously
meeting their unique and individualized needs. Public education with students
without disabilities may enhance social development and aptitude, but
classroom instruction should only be afforded to children with disabilities
when it is practical, economic and safe.
Hiring and training competent personnel to provide full-time nursing
services to a dependent student burdens a school district with economic and
accountability concerns.287 In addition, the risk of a traumatic or fatal accident
is presumably greater for students suffering from severe disabilities who
require continuous medical attention. The extent and nature of the care
provided will establish if the health care services must be delivered
continuously and intensely as the “private duty” of a school nurse.288
Health services are deemed appropriate when they are “related services”
and are provided by a school nurse or other qualified individual. “Medical
services” are included in the definition of “related services,” so long as they
are not provided beyond diagnostic or evaluative purposes.289 Although the
IDEA makes no reference to a “provider-based” distinction regarding “medical
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra notes 180 and 197 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 225-37 and 251 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 222, 238 and 240-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-85, 118-19, 146 and 257 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84-85, 145-47 and 149 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118, 168-71, 233 and 234-36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56 and 58-60 and accompanying text.
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services,” the Tatro Court improperly concluded that the difference between
“medical services” and “related services” is that a physician provides the
former, while the latter is provided by anyone other than a physician. Thus,
services that are provided by a school nurse are included “related services,” but
if a physician performs the exact same services, then they are excluded
“medical services.” It is illogical to say that a medically related disability
requiring constant health services includes “related services,” but does not
integrate “medical services” because of the profession of the provider.290
The definition of “medical services” in other legislation is written to
include treatment, rehabilitation and preventative health services.291 Again,
there is no distinction based on the status of the provider. Although the IDEA
did not explicitly define “medical services” to include the aforementioned
services, the term “related services” does consist of these types of services as
well as “medical services.” While Congress did not specifically define
“medical services,” it is not evident from the IDEA that Congress intended or
even considered that services provided by a physician should be excluded as
“medical services.”
School nurses provide extensive and intense health care services to
children with disabilities, treatment in critical situations and rehabilitative and
preventative health services to reduce and evade unfavorable health conditions.
Thus, as an inherent responsibility of the profession, nurses provide medical
services. These medical services should be excluded from the burden on
school districts based on the extent and nature of the services provided by a
school nurse to a student with severe disabilities.292 It is unreasonable to limit
the provision of health care services beyond evaluative or diagnostic purposes
to a “physician-based” rule.293
The purpose of excluding “medical services” is to reduce the burden on
school districts from providing complex “school health services.”294 However,
simplistic “related services” can become extraordinarily complicated when
problems arise for students with disabilities who require full-time nursing
services. To maintain the spirit of the IDEA, it is more reasonable and fair to
exclude burdensome nursing services that demand extensive health care and
attention and that are more analogous to “medical services” than “related
services.”295

290. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
291. 38 U.S.C. § 1701(8) (1994). Rehabilitative services means services “necessary to
restore . . . the physical, mental, and psychological functioning of an ill or disabled person.” Id.
292. See supra notes 118-20, 124, 129-31, 155 and 255 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 118-20, 123 and 130 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garret imposes upon school districts the
responsibility of staffing specialized personal attendants for students with
handicaps who cannot perform the daily functions of life without habitual
supervision and assistance. Because of this onerous responsibility, it is
conceivable that schools will be compelled to have immediate access to
emergency care facilities in case of a crisis situation where expert services
would be essential. The potential irreparable harm to a susceptible student
with disabilities because of incompetent personnel or insufficient training also
substantially increases the liability of a school district.296
The risk, obligation and liability of a school district should be balanced
with the opportunity for “meaningful access” to a “free appropriate public
education” for students with disabilities. Basing the distinction of “medical
services” and “related services” on the title and education of the provider is
simply inadequate and fails to define the “medical services” expression.297 It is
difficult to comprehend how medically related health services, which appear
medical in nature, are not considered “medical services.” Limiting health
services to students with handicaps via a “provider-based” rule is unwarranted
and should not be the deciding factor of the services that are provided.
The IDEA does not require school districts to provide an equal opportunity
to public education for special needs students.298 Although schools and
teachers educate children to become productive citizens and future leaders in
society, they are not in the business of providing private health services to
children with extensive handicaps.299 It is not suggested that students with
disabilities do not deserve an education or that they cannot be productive
citizens and/or future leaders. This Note plausibly advocates that the statutory
interpretation of the IDEA does not require the maximum educational
opportunity, but rather an appropriate education that considers the extent and
nature of the health related services before requiring intense, comprehensive
and expensive full-time nursing services for students with extreme
disabilities.300
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